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Bit Commitment from Non-Signaling Correlations
Severin Winkler, Ju¨rg Wullschleger, and Stefan Wolf
Abstract—Central cryptographic functionalities such as en-
cryption, authentication, or secure two-party computation cannot
be realized in an information-theoretically secure way from
scratch. This serves as a motivation to study what (possibly weak)
primitives they can be based on. We consider as such starting
points general two-party input-output systems that do not allow
for message transmission, and show that they can be used for
realizing unconditionally secure bit commitment as soon as they
are non-trivial, i.e., cannot be securely realized from distributed
randomness only.
Index Terms—Unconditional security, bit commitment, non-
locality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern cryptography deals — besides the classical tasks
of encryption and authentication — with secure cooperation
between two (or more) parties willing to collaborate but
distrusting each other. Examples of important functionalities
of such secure two-party computation are bit commitment
and oblivious transfer. In this note, we concentrate on bit
commitment, a primitive which, for instance, allows for fair
coin flipping [1] and has central applications in interactive
proof systems.
A bit commitment scheme is a protocol between two
parties, Alice and Bob, that consists of two stages. First,
they execute Commit where Alice chooses a bit b as input.
Later, they execute Open where Alice reveals the bit b to Bob.
The security properties of bit commitment are the following.
Security for Alice ensures that the Commit protocol does not
give any information about the bit b to Bob. Security for Bob,
on the other hand, means that after the execution of Commit, b
cannot be changed anymore by Alice. Ideally, one would like
these security properties to hold even against an adversary with
unlimited computing power.
It is well known that unconditionally secure bit commitment
cannot be implemented from (noiseless) classical commu-
nication only — and the same is true even for (noiseless)
quantum communication [2], [3]. Therefore, it is interesting
to study unconditionally secure reductions of bit commitment
to weaker primitives, e.g., to physical assumptions. It is known
that bit commitment can be realized from communication
over noisy channels [4], [5] or from pieces of correlated
randomness [6], [7], [8].
Measurements on entangled quantum states can produce so-
called non-local correlations, i.e., correlations that cannot be
simulated with shared classical information. These correlations
can be modeled as bipartite input-output systems that are
S. Winkler and S. Wolf are with the Computer Science Department,
ETH Zu¨rich, CH-8092 Zu¨rich, Switzerland (e-mail: swinkler@ethz.ch;
wolf@inf.ethz.ch).
J. Wullschleger is with the Department of Mathematics, University of
Bristol, Bristol BS8 1TW, U.K. (e-mail: j.wullschleger@bristol.ac.uk).
characterized by a conditional distribution PXY |UV , where U
and V stand for the inputs and X and Y for the outputs
of the system, respectively. We only consider correlations
that are non-signaling, i.e., which do not allow for message
transmission from one side to the other. When using a non-
signaling system, a party receives its output immediately after
giving its input, independently of whether the other party has
given its input already. This prevents the parties from signaling
by delaying their inputs. An example of such a system is the
non-local box (NL box for short) proposed by Popescu and
Rohrlich [9], where the inputs and outputs are binary, each
output is a uniform bit, independent of the pair of inputs, but
X ⊕ Y = U ∧ V always holds.
As bit commitment cannot be implemented from quantum
communication, the question has been studied whether bit
commitment can be realized when the two parties share trusted
non-local correlations as a resource. It has been proven in
[10] that unconditionally secure bit commitment can be imple-
mented from NL boxes. This result shows that unconditionally
secure computation can be realized from non-signaling sys-
tems in principle. In particular, it implies that the problems that
arise from the fact that any non-signaling system allows the
parties to delay their inputs can be circumvented. However, the
correlations of an NL box cannot be realized by measurements
on a quantum state [11]. In the present article we show that
any non-signaling system providing binary outputs can either
be simulated securely with shared randomness, or allows for
information-theoretically secure bit commitment (Theorem 3);
our condition is thus tight. This implies in particular that even
local non-signaling correlations can be used to implement
unconditionally secure bit commitment if they are provided
as a trusted resource to the two parties.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Bit Commitment
A bit commitment scheme is a pair of protocols Commit
and Open executed by two parties Alice and Bob. First, Alice
and Bob execute Commit where Alice has a bit b as input. Bob
either accepts or rejects the execution of Commit. Later, they
execute Open where Bob has output (accept, b′) or reject.
The two protocols must have the following (ideal) properties:
• Correctness: If both parties follow the protocol, then Bob
always accepts with b′ = b.
• Hiding: If Alice is honest, then committing to b does not
reveal any information about b to Bob.1
• Binding: If Bob is honest and accepts after the execution
of Commit, then there exists only one value b′ (which is
1Bob’s views for b = 0 and b = 1 are indistinguishable.
2equal to b, if Alice is honest) that Bob accepts as output
after the execution of Open.
In the following we call a bit commitment scheme secure, if
it fulfills the above ideal requirements except with an error
that can be made negligible (as a function of some security
parameter n).
B. Notation
Let W : X → Y be a stochastic matrix with rows indexed
by elements of X and columns indexed by elements of Y .
We denote the entries of W by W (y|x) = Wx(y) and the
row vector indexed by x by Wx. Wx(·) defines a probability
distribution on Y for every x ∈ X , i.e., for all x it holds
that W (y|x) ≥ 0 for all y and ∑yW (y|x) = 1. We denote
by conv(W ) the convex hull of the set {Wx|x ∈ X}, i.e.,
the convex hull of the row vectors of W . We call Wx0
an extreme point of this set if the convex hull of the set
({Wx|x ∈ X}\{Wx0}) is strictly smaller. We denote the
set of extreme points by extr(conv(W )). We call Wz0 non-
extreme if it is not an extreme point of conv(W ). We denote
by xn = (x1, . . . , xn) a sequence of elements in X or a vector
in Xn. If I := {i1, . . . , ik} ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} then xI denotes
the sub-sequence (xi1 , xi2 , . . . , xik ) of xn. We denote by h(·)
the binary entropy function.
We call a function f(n) ≥ 0 negligible if for any c > 0,
there exists nc such that for all n > nc, f(n) < 1/nc . We
call f(n) overwhelming if 1− f(n) is negligible.
C. Non-Signaling Boxes
A non-signaling box is defined by a stochastic matrix
W : U × V → X × Y
as follows: Alice gives an input u ∈ U and Bob gives an
input v ∈ V . Alice gets output x ∈ X and Bob y ∈ Y
with probability W (xy|uv). Furthermore, the following non-
signaling conditions must hold∑
y
W (xy|uv) =
∑
y
W (xy|uv′) ∀u, v, v′, x,
∑
x
W (xy|uv) =
∑
x
W (xy|u′v) ∀u, u′, v, y,
i.e., the distribution of Alice’s output is independent of Bob’s
input (and vice-versa). A party receives its output immediately
after giving its input, independently of whether the other party
has given its input already. Note that this is possible, since the
box is non-signaling. Furthermore, after a box is used once,
it is destroyed. The set of non-signaling boxes can be divided
into two types: local and non-local. A box is local if and only
if it can be simulated by non-communicating parties with only
shared randomness as a resource. This means that there exist
probabilities pi and stochastic matrices V iA, V iB such that
W (xy|uv) =
n∑
i=1
piV
i
A(x|u)V iB(y|v) ∀u, v, x, y. (1)
A box is called independent if there exist stochastic matrices
VA, VB such that
W (xy|uv) = VA(x|u)VB(y|v) ∀u, v, x, y,
i.e., such a box can be simulated without any shared resources
at all. In the following we only consider boxes with binary
outputs, i.e., X = Y = {0, 1}. We define
WA(x|u) :=
∑
y
W (xy|uv) ∀u, v, x,
WB(y|v) :=
∑
x
W (xy|uv) ∀u, v, y.
We call a box with binary outputs perfectly correlated for an
input pair (u, v) ∈ U × V if
W (01|uv) = W (10|uv) = 0
and perfectly anti-correlated if
W (00|uv) = W (11|uv) = 0.
An input u for Alice is called redundant if there exists u˜ 6= u
such that
W (xy|uv) = W (xy|u˜v) ∀x, y, v.
D. Chernoff/Hoeffding Bounds
We will use the following bounds attributed to Chernoff
[12] and Hoeffding [13].
Lemma 1. Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be independent random vari-
ables with Pr[Xi = 1] = pi and Pr[Xi = 0] = 1 − pi. Let
X =
∑n
i=1Xi and µ = E[X ]. Then for any 0 < δ < 1 it
holds that
Pr[X > (1 + δ)µ] ≤ exp(−δ2µ/3) ,
Pr[X < (1− δ)µ] ≤ exp(−δ2µ/2) .
Lemma 2. Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be independent random vari-
ables with Pr[Xi = 1] = pi and Pr[Xi = 0] = 1 − pi. Let
X =
∑n
i=1Xi and µ = E[X ]. Then for any 0 < δ < 1 it
holds that
Pr[X > µ+ δ] ≤ exp(−2δ2/n) ,
Pr[X < µ− δ] ≤ exp(−2δ2/n) .
E. Information Theory
We will use the smoothed versions of the min-entropy [14].
For an event E , let PXE|Y=y(x) be the probability that X = x
and the event E occurs, conditioned on Y = y. We define
Hǫ∞(X |Y ) := max
E:Pr(E)≥1−ǫ
min
y
min
x
(− logPXE|Y=y(x)).
We will make use of the following lemma from [14].
Lemma 3. Let PXY Z be a probability distribution. For any
ǫ, ǫ′ > 0,
Hǫ+ǫ
′
∞ (X |Y Z) ≥ Hǫ∞(XY |Z)− log(|Y|) − log(1/ǫ′) .
The following lemma from [15] gives a lower bound for the
smooth entropy of n-fold product distributions:
Lemma 4. Let PXnY n := PX1Y1 . . . PXnYn be a probability
distribution over Xn × Yn and let ǫ > 0. Then
Hǫ∞(X
n|Y n) ≥ H(Xn|Y n)− 4
√
n log(1/ǫ) log(|X |) .
3F. Randomness Extraction
A function f : X × S → Y is called a two-universal hash
function [16] if for all x0 6= x1 we have
Pr[f(x0, S) = f(x1, S)] ≤ 1|Y|
if S is uniform over S. The following lemma from [17], [18]
shows that two-universal hash functions are strong extractors,
i.e., the concatenation of the seed and the output of the
extractor is close to uniform.
Lemma 5 (Leftover hash lemma). Let f : X × S → Y be a
two-universal hash function with m > 0. Let X be a random
variable over X and let ǫ > 0. If
H∞(X)− 2 log(1/ǫ) ≥ m,
then 12 ||(f(S,X), S)−(U, S)||1 ≤ ǫ for S and U independent
and uniform over S and Y .
G. Typical Sequences
In this section we will state and prove some basic results
on typical sequences. More details on this topic can be found
in the book by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [19].
Definition 1. Let P be a probability distribution on X and
ǫ > 0. Then the set of ǫ-typical sequences is defined as:
T nP,ǫ := {xn ∈ Xn : ∀x ∈ X |N(x|xn)− P (x)n| ≤ ǫn
and P (x) = 0⇒ N(x|xn) = 0},
where N(x|xn) denotes the number of letters x in xn.
Definition 2. For a stochastic matrix W : X → Z we define
the set of W -typical sequences under the condition xn ∈ Xn
with constant ǫ as
T nW,ǫ(xn) = {zn :∀x, z|N(xz|xnzn)−Wx(z)N(x|xn)| ≤ ǫn
and Wx(z) = 0⇒ N(xz|xnzn) = 0}.
The following two well-known lemmas follow directly from
Lemma 1.
Lemma 6. Pn(T nP,ǫ) ≥ 1− 2|X | exp(−nǫ2/3)
Lemma 7. Wnxn(T nW,ǫ(xn)) ≥ 1− 2|X ||Z| exp(−nǫ2/3)
Using the results above we will prove a lemma that we
will use in the security proofs in this paper. The lemma is
similar to Lemma 14 in [5]. Let W : X → Z be a (discrete
memoryless) channel, let a ∈ X be an input such that the
output distribution of a is not a convex combination of the
other output distributions and let xn, x˜n ∈ Xn be sequences
such that |{k : xk 6= a and x˜k = a}| ≥ κn. Then the
lemma states that the output of the channel, given xn as input,
will not be W -typical conditioned on x˜n with overwhelming
probability if exp(−κ2n) is negligible.
Lemma 8. Let W : X → Z be a stochastic matrix and a ∈ X
such that for all probability distributions P over X such that
P (a) = 0 and ∥∥∥Wa −∑
x
P (x)Wx
∥∥∥
1
≥ δ .
Let xn, x˜n ∈ Xn with dH(xIa , x˜Ia) ≥ κn where Ia := {k :
x˜k = a}. If na := |Ia| ≥ λn, then
Wnxn(T nW,ǫ(x˜n)) ≤ 2 exp(−nǫ2/3)
where ǫ := 12|Z|λδκ.
Proof: Let D := {k ∈ Ia : xk 6= x˜k}. Then it follows
that∥∥∥ 1
na
∑
k∈Ia
Wxk −Wa
∥∥∥
1
=
|D|
na
∥∥∥Wa − 1|D|
∑
k∈D
Wxk
∥∥∥
1
≥ |D|
na
δ ≥ κδ . (2)
This implies that there exists b ∈ Z such that∣∣∣ 1
na
∑
k∈Ia
Wxk(b)−Wa(b)
∣∣∣ ≥ 1|Z|κδ .
Let wn ∈ T nW,ǫ(x˜n). Then it holds that∣∣∣N(b|wIa)− ∑
k∈Ia
Wxk(b)
∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣N(ab|x˜nwn)− ∑
k∈Ia
Wxk(b)
∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣ ∑
k∈Ia
Wzk(b)− naWa(b)
∣∣∣− ∣∣∣naWa(b)−N(ab|x˜nwn)∣∣∣
≥ 1|Z|κδna − ǫn
≥ 1
2|Z|κδλna .
We define independent binary random variables Xk, k ∈ Ia,
with distributions PXk(1) := Wxk(b). Let X =
∑
k∈Ia
Xi
and µ := E[X ] =
∑
k∈Ia
Wxk(b). Let t := 12|Z|κδλnaµ
−1
(assuming µ 6= 0). Using the Chernoff bound it follows that
Wnxn(T nW,ǫ(x˜n)) ≤ Pr
[
|X − µ| ≥ 1
2|Z|κδλna
]
= Pr[|X − µ| ≥ tµ]
≤ 2 exp(−ǫ2n/3) .
III. IMPOSSIBILITY
The following theorem proves that a certain class of non-
signaling boxes can be securely implemented from shared
randomness alone and does, therefore, not allow for unconditi-
nally secure bit commitment (otherwise bit commitment could
be implemented form noiseless communication only, which is
well known to be impossible).
Theorem 1. Let a local non-signaling box with binary output
be defined by W : U × V → {0, 1}2 such that
W (xy|uv) = pV 0A(x|u)V 0B(y|v) + (1− p)V 1A(x|u)V 1B(y|v)
and there exists u0 ∈ U , v0 ∈ V and b0, b1 ∈ {0, 1} with:
V 0A(0|u0) = V 1A(1|u0) = b0
V 0A(1|u0) = V 1A(0|u0) = 1− b0
V 0B(0|v0) = V 1B(1|v0) = b1
V 1B(1|v0) = V 0B(0|v0) = 1− b1 ,
4then there is no reduction of information-theoretically secure
bit commitment to the box W (with noiseless communication
only).
Proof: We prove the statement by showing that one can
securely implement such a box from noiseless communication
and shared randomness alone. The implementation directly
follows the definition of the box: Let λ be the shared random
bit. Alice on input u outputs 0 with probability V λA (0|u)
and 1 with probability V λA (1|u) = 1 − V λA (0|u). Bob on
input v outputs b ∈ {0, 1} with probability V λB (b|v). This
perfectly implements the behavior of the box. Furthermore,
this implementation is secure, since Alice and Bob can get
the same information (i.e. the shared randomness λ) if they
only have black-box access to W , if they always input u0 and
v0, respectively.
IV. TWO PROTOCOLS
We will now give two slightly different protocols, which
work for two different kinds of non-signaling boxes.
A. Protocol I
Informally, the first protocol works as follows: in the
Commit protocol an honest Alice gives a fixed input to all her
boxes, while Bob chooses his inputs randomly. Alice applies
privacy amplification to the outputs of the boxes and uses
the resulting key K to hide the bit B she wants to commit
to. Alice then sends K ⊕ B and the randomness used for
privacy amplification to Bob. In the Open protocol Alice sends
her outputs from the boxes. Alice’s input is chosen such that
there is a statistical test that allows Bob to detect if Alice has
changed more than O(
√
n) output values while Bob has only
limited information about the output of the boxes before the
opening phase. A dishonest Alice might still be able to change
O(
√
n) output values. To ensure that this is not possible, we
use a linear code and let Alice send parity check bits of the
output to Bob in the Commit protocol. If the minimal distance
of the code is large enough, no two strings with the same parity
check bits lie in a hamming sphere with radius proportional
to
√
n.
Let Alice and Bob share n identical non-signaling boxes
given by W : U×V → {0, 1}2. In our protocol, we will require
Bob to choose his input uniformly from V . For an honest Bob
and a potentially malicious Alice, we can define a stochastic
matrix Wˆ : {0, 1}×U → {0, 1}×V describing the probability
of Bob’s input and output values v and y, conditioned on
Alice’s input u and output x as
Wˆ (yv|xu) := 1|V|
W (xy|uv)
WA(x|u) ,
if WA(x|u) 6= 0, and undefined otherwise. Furthermore,
we will require an honest Alice to always input a fixed
value ua to the box. For an honest Alice, and a potentially
malicious Bob that chooses his input v ∈ {0, 1} freely, we
can define random variables Xv, Yv depending on Bob’s input
that describe the output of Alice and Bob, respectively, i.e.
with a joint distribution
PXvYv (x, y) := W (xy|uav).
The protocol below is secure if there exists a value a =
(xa, ua) such that the following condition is fulfilled:
Condition 1. (1) There exists δ > 0 such that for all
probability distributions P over {0, 1}2 with P (a) = 0 it holds
that ∥∥∥Wˆa −∑
x
P (x)Wˆx
∥∥∥
1
≥ δ .
(2) There exists γ > 0 such that for all v ∈ V it holds that
H(Xv|Yv) ≥ γ,
i.e., the Shannon entropy of Alice’s output given Bob’s output
is non-zero for all possible inputs of Bob.
We label the inputs of Alice as {0, . . . , |U| − 1}. Fur-
thermore, we define the distribution of Alice’s output x if
her input is ua as P (x) := WA(x|ua) for all x ∈ {0, 1}.
Let λ := 12min{P (x), x ∈ {0, 1}}. Let k be the security
parameter. Let ǫ := 14λδk/n. Let d > 2k and let H
be the parity check matrix of a linear [n,Rn, d]-code with
R > (1 − γ). Since we do not have to decode, this could be
a random linear code chosen by Bob. Let l := γn − n(1 −
R) − 4
√
nk − 3k. We choose k := n2/3, which implies that
k,
√
nk ∈ O(n5/6) and k, k2/n, nǫ2 ∈ Ω(n1/3). It follows
that l ∈ (γ+R− 1)n−O(n5/6). If n is big enough, we have
l > 0. Let ext : {0, 1}∗×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}l be a two-universal
hash function. We define syn(xn) := HTxn.
Commit(bl):
• Bob chooses vn ∈R {0, 1}n
• Alice and Bob input una and vn component-wise to the
boxes. Alice gets xn ∈ {0, 1}n and Bob yn ∈ {0, 1}n.
• Alice chooses r ∈R {0, 1}∗ and sends
(syn(xn), r, bl ⊕ ext(r, xn)) to Bob.
Open():
• Alice sends Bob xn and bl.
• Bob checks:
– syn(xn) is correct
– b⊕ ext(r, xn) is correct
– ((y1, v1), .., (yn, vn)) ∈ T nWˆ ,ǫ((x1, ua), .., (xn, ua))
– xn ∈ T nP,ǫ
• If all the checks pass successfully, Bob accepts and
outputs bl, otherwise he rejects.
B. Security
Let un := (u1, . . . , un) be Alice’s inputs to the
boxes, let xn := (x1, . . . , xn) be her outputs from the
boxes and let x˜n := (x˜1, . . . , x˜n) be the values Alice
sends to Bob in the opening phase. We define zn :=
((x1, u1), . . . , (xn, un)) and z˜n := ((x˜1, ua), . . . , (x˜n, ua)).
Let rn := ((y1, v1), . . . , (yn, vn)) be Bob’s inputs and outputs.
Lemma 9. The protocols Commit and Open satisfy the
correctness condition.
Proof: Bob always accepts Commit. If Alice follows the
protocol, then syn(xn) and bl⊕ ext(r1, un) are correct. From
5Lemma 7 it follows that
Pr[rn ∈ T n
Wˆ ,ǫ
(zn)] = Wˆzn(TWˆ ,ǫ(zn))
≥ 1− 16|V| exp(−nǫ2/3) ,
and from Lemma 6 it follows that
Pr[xn ∈ T nP,ǫ] = Pnxn(TP,ǫ)
≥ 1− 4 exp(−nǫ2/3) .
Thus, Bob accepts Open with overwhelming probability and
outputs bl, the value Alice was committed to.
Lemma 10. The protocol Commit satisfies the privacy con-
dition with an error negligible in n.
Proof: Let us assume that Alice is honest. Alice inputs
ua into the boxes as required by the protocol, while Bob can
choose its input vn = (v1, . . . , vn) freely. We then define the
random variables Xn = Xv1 × . . . × Xvn and Y n = Yv1 ×
. . .×Yvn . Let ǫ1 := 2−k. According to Lemma 4 it holds that
Hǫ1min(X
n|Y n) ≥ H(Xn|Y n)− 4
√
nk.
Using Lemma 3 with get that
H2ǫ1min(X
n|syn(Xn)V n) ≥ Hǫ1min(Xn|Y n)− n(1−R)
− log(1/ǫ1)
≥ γn− n(1−R)− 4
√
nk − k
= l + 2k .
According to Lemma 5 Bob has no information about
ext(r1, x
n) except with probability 2ǫ1 + ǫ1.
Lemma 11. If dH(xn, x˜n) ≥ k, then the probability that Bob
accepts x˜n is negligible in n.
Proof: From dH(xn, x˜n) ≥ k follows dH(zn, z˜n) ≥ k.
Let na := N(ua|un), Ia := {k : z˜k = (xa, ua)} and p :=
WA(xa|ua). For all wn ∈ T nP,ǫ, we have
|N(xa|wn)− np| ≤ ǫn = 1
4
λδk/n · n ≤ 1
8
kp ,
since λ ≤ p/2 and δ ≤ 1. We distinguish two cases:
(1) na ≤ (n − k/2): The expectation of N((xa, ua)|zn) is
smaller than or equal to (n − k2 )p. Since k2/n ∈ Ω(n1/3), it
follows from Lemma 1 that with overwhelming probability
N((xa, ua)|zn) ≤
(
n− k
2
)
p+
k
8
p
=
(
n− 3
8
k
)
p.
But since Bob only accepts if x˜n ∈ T nP,ǫ, we have
dH(z
Ia , z˜Ia) ≥
(
n− 1
4
k
)
p−
(
n− 3
8
k
)
p
=
1
4
kp
and the claim follows from Lemma 8.
(2) na > (n − k/2): Then the expectation of N((1 −
xa, ua)|zn) is greater than or equal to (n − k2 )(1 − p). As
k2/n ∈ Ω(n1/3) Lemma 1 implies that with overwhelming
probability
N((1− xa, ua)|zn) ≥
(
n− k
2
)
(1− p)− k
8
(1− p)
= n(1− p)− 5
8
k(1− p).
But since Bob only accepts if x˜n ∈ T nP,ǫ, we have
dH(z
Ia , z˜Ia) ≥
(
n− 5
8
k
)
(1− p)−
(
n− 1
4
k
)
(1− p)
=
1
4
k(1− p)
and the claim follows from Lemma 8.
Lemma 12. The protocol satisfies the binding condition with
an error negligible in n.
Proof: Any two strings sn 6= s˜n with syn(sn) = syn(s˜n)
have distance at least d. So at least one of the two strings has
distance at least k from Alice’s output xn. The probability
that Bob accepts this string in the opening phase is negligible
according to lemma 11.
C. Protocol II
Protocol I is not hiding if for every fixed input of Alice a
dishonest Bob can choose an input such that he has perfect
information about Alice’s output. This is the case for example
with the above mentioned NL box. But, as shown in [10], this
box allows for bit commitment. Therefore, we present a second
protocol that allows to securely implement bit commitment
for such boxes. The protocol, which is similar to a protocol
proposed without a security proof in [20] already, works as
follows: Alice gives random inputs to all her boxes. Then
she applies privacy amplification to the string of inputs and
uses the resulting key to hide the bit she is committed to. In
the opening phase Alice sends all her inputs/outputs to Bob.
Bob performs statistical tests on the input/output of Alice that
allow him to detect if Alice has changed more than
√
n values.
We use again parity check bits of a linear code to make sure
that a dishonest Alice cannot change
√
n values except with
negligible probability.
Alice and Bob share n identical non-signaling boxes given
by W : U ×V → {0, 1}2. We define the corresponding matrix
Wˆ as in Section IV-A. In the following we always assume that
WA(x|u) 6= 0 for all x ∈ {0, 1}, u ∈ U . For the following
protocol to be secure we require W to fulfill the following
condition:
Condition 2. There exist u0, u1 ∈ U , u0 6= u1, such
that the set D := {Wˆ0u0 , Wˆ1u1 , Wˆ0u0 , Wˆ1u1} contains
at most one non-extreme point of conv(Wˆ ), i.e., there
is c0 ∈ {0u0, 1u1, 0u0, 1u1} such that for all c ∈
{0u0, 1u1, 0u0, 1u1}\{c0} it holds that for all probability
distributions P with P (c) = 0∥∥∥Wˆc −∑
z
P (z)Wˆz
∥∥∥
1
≥ δ .
We label the inputs of Alice as {0, . . . , |U|−1} and assume
that u0 = 0 and u1 = 1. In the protocol, we will require
6Alice to choose her input uniformly from {0, 1}, and Bob to
choose his input uniformly from V . If both are honest, the
joint distribution of the inputs and outputs of Alice and Bob
is
P (x, y, u, v) :=
{
1
2|V|W (xy|uv), if u ∈ {0, 1}
0, else.
If Alice is honest, the joint distribution of her input and output
is
Q(x, u) :=
{
1
2W
A(x|u), if u ∈ {0, 1}
0, else.
Let λ := 14min{Q(x, u), (x, u) ∈ {0, 1}2}. Let p0 :=
min{WA(x|u), (x, u) ∈ {0, 1}2}. Note that we assumed
p0 > 0 and that obviously we also have p0 ≤ 12 . Let k1 be
the security parameter, k2 := k1(4p0+1)/2p20, ǫ := 14λδk1/n,
d ≥ k1 +2k2 +1, l > 0 and let H be the parity check matrix
of a [n,Rn, d]-linear code with Rn ≥ n/2 + 32k1 + l/2. We
choose k1 := n2/3 and l := n−2n(1−R)−3k1. This implies
k1, k
2
1/n, nǫ
2 ∈ Ω(n1/3) and l ∈ (2R−1)n−O(n2/3). If n is
big enough, then l > 0. Let ext : {0, 1}∗× {0, 1}n → {0, 1}l
be a two-universal hash function.
Commit(bl):
• Alice chooses un ∈R {0, 1}n, Bob chooses vn ∈R V .
• Alice and Bob input un and vn component-wise to the
boxes. Alice gets xn ∈ {0, 1}n and Bob yn ∈ {0, 1}n.
• Alice chooses r2 ∈R {0, 1}∗ and sends
(syn(un), syn(xn), r2, b
l ⊕ ext(r2, xn)) to Bob.
Open():
• Alice sends Bob un, xn and bl.
• Bob checks:
– syn(un) and syn(xn) are correct
– bl ⊕ ext(r2, un) is correct
– ((y1, v1), .., (yn, vn)) ∈ T nWˆ ,ǫ((x1, u1), .., (xn, un))
– ((x1, u1), . . . , (xn, un)) ∈ T nQ,ǫ
• If all the checks pass successfully, Bob accepts and
outputs bl, otherwise he rejects.
D. Security
Let zn := ((x1, u1), . . . , (xn, un)) be Alice’s input and
output, z˜n := ((x˜1, u˜1), . . . , (x˜n, u˜n)) the values Alice sends
to Bob in the opening phase and rn := ((y1, v1), . . . , (yn, vn))
Bob’s inputs and outputs. For all c ∈ ({0, 1} × U) we define
the sets Ic := {i : z˜i = c}.
Lemma 13. The protocols Commit and Open satisfy the
correctness condition.
Proof: Bob always accepts Commit. If Alice follows
the protocol, then syn(un), syn(xn) and bl ⊕ ext(r2, un) are
correct. From Lemma 7 it follows that
Pr[rn ∈ T n
Wˆ ,ǫ
(zn))] = Wˆzn(TWˆ ,ǫ(zn))
≥ 1− 8|U||V| exp(−nǫ2/2)
and from Lemma 6 it follows that
Pr[zn ∈ T nQ,ǫ] = Qn(TQ,ǫ(zn))
≥ 1− 4|U| exp(−nǫ2/2) .
Thus, Bob accepts Open with overwhelming probability and
outputs bl, the value Alice was committed to.
Lemma 14. The protocol Commit satisfies the privacy con-
dition with an error negligible in n.
Proof: Let us assume that Alice is honest. Since the box
is non-signaling, Bob’s values Y n and V n are independent of
Un. Since Alice chooses Un uniformly from {0, 1}n, we have
H∞(U
n) = n .
All the information Bob gets about Un is syn(Un) and
syn(Xn). Let ǫ1 := 2−k1 . Using Lemma 3 we get
Hǫ1∞(U
n|syn(Un)syn(Xn)) ≥ n− 2n(1− R)− k1
≥ l+ 2k1 .
If follows from Lemma 5 that extracting l bits makes the key
uniform with an error of at most 2ǫ1 = 2 ·2−k1 . The statement
follows.
The proof of the binding condition is slightly more involved.
Because our boxes are non-signaling, Alice has the possibility
of delaying her input to the box until the opening phase.
Hence, a general strategy for her is to give input to some
of the boxes in the commit phase, and to delay the input to
some of the boxes until the opening phase. And she may send
incorrect values about her input/output to/from the boxes to
Bob in the opening phase. Note that we can ignore the case
where she does not give any input to some boxes, as she might
as well just give input but ignore the output.
Lemma 15. If dH(zn, z˜n) ≥ k1, then the probability that Bob
accepts z˜n is negligible.
Proof: For all wn ∈ T nQ,ǫ it holds that
|N(xu|wn)− nQ(x, u)| ≤ ǫn = 1
4
λδk1/n · n ≤ 1
64
k1 ,
since λ ≤ minx,uQ(x, u)/4 ≤ 1/16 and δ ≤ 1.
We distinguish the following two cases:
(1) There exists u′ ∈ {0, 1} such that N(u′|un) ≤ n/2−k1/8:
For all x ∈ {0, 1} the expectation of N(xu′|zn) is equal to
(n/2− k18 )WA(x|u′). Since k21/n ∈ Ω(n1/3) it follows from
Lemma 1 that with overwhelming probability
N(xu′|zn) ≤
(n
2
− 1
8
k1
)
WA(x|u′) + 1
16
k1W
A(x|u′)
=
(n
2
− 1
16
k1
)
WA(x|u′) .
But since Bob only accepts if z˜n ∈ T nQ,ǫ, we have
dH(z
I0u′ , z˜I0u′ ) ≥ 132k1 and dH(zI1u′ , z˜I1u′ ) ≥ 132k1, and
the claim follows from Lemma 8.
(2) For all u ∈ {0, 1} we have |n/2 − N(u|un)| ≤ k1/8:
Since ǫ2n ∈ Ω(n1/3) it follows from Lemma 7 that with
overwhelming probability we have zn ∈ T nWA,ǫ(un). Assume
zn ∈ T nWA,ǫ(un). There exists a value (x′, u′) ∈ {0, 1}2 such
7that dH(zIx′u′ , z˜Ix′u′ ) ≥ 14k1. Therefore
N(x′u′|zn) + dH(zIx′u′ , z˜Ix′u′ )
≥ nWA(x′|u′)/2− k1WA(x′|u′)/8− ǫn+ k1/4
≥ nWA(x′|u′)/2 + 7
64
k1 .
If there exists (x′′, u′′) 6= (x′, u′) ∈ {0, 1}2 such that
dH(z
Ix′′u′′ , z˜Ix′′u′′ ) ≥ 132k1, then the claim follows from
Lemma 8. Otherwise z˜n /∈ T nQ,ǫ.
Next, we will prove a technical lemma:
Lemma 16. For any n it holds that, if k ≤ np,
k∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
pi(1− p)n−i ≤ 2−2np2+4pk.
Proof: Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be random variables with
Pr[Xi = 1] = p and Pr[Xi = 0] = (1 − p). Let
X =
∑n
i=1Xi. Then using Lemma 2 and setting t := np− k
k∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
pi(1− p)n−i = Pr[X ≤ k] ≤ exp(−2t2/n)
≤ 2−2(np−k)2/n
≤ 2−2np2+4pk.
Lemma 17. If Alice does not input any values to at least k2
boxes before sending syn(xn) to Bob, then Bob does accept
the opening of the protocol with negligible probability.
Proof: Alice does not give any input to at least k2 boxes
before sending a syndrome s0 to Bob. Later she gives her
inputs to the remaining k2 boxes and gets a random output
xi for each box. We know that any two strings sn 6= s˜n with
syn(sn) = syn(s˜n) have distance at least d > 2k2. We can
bound the probability that the output string has distance at
most k1 to a string with syndrome s0 by
k1∑
i=0
(
k2
i
)
pi0(1 − p0)k2−i.
Note that since 4p0+1 > 1 and 2p0 ≤ 1, we have p0k2 ≥ k1.
So we can apply Lemma 16 and get an upper bound on this
probability of
2−2k2p
2
0+4k1p0 = 2
−2
k1(4p0+1)
2p20
p20+4k1p0
= 2−k1 .
The statement now follows from Lemma 15.
Lemma 18. If Alice changes only k1 values and delays only
k2 inputs, then the protocol is binding.
Proof: Any two input strings sn and s˜n with s0 =
syn(sn) = syn(s˜n) have distance at least d. If we ignore
all the positions where Alice did not input anything to the
box, sn and s˜n still have distance at least d− k2 > 2k1.
V. TIGHTNESS OF OUR RESULTS
In this section we show that every non-signaling box with
binary outputs that cannot be securely implemented from
shared randomness allows to realize bit commitment with one
of the above protocols.
Lemma 19. Let W : U × V → {0, 1}2 be a non-signaling
box with |U| ≥ 2. If there exists (x0, u0) such that either
WA(x0|u0) = 0 or Wˆx0u0 = Wˆx1u1 for some (x1, u1) 6=
(x0, u0) with WA(x0|u0) ≤WA(x1|u1), then bit commitment
can be implemented from W if and only if bit commitment can
be implemented from the reduced box W˜ that is obtained by
removing input u0 from W . Furthermore, W is local if and
only if W˜ is local.
Proof: We prove the statement by showing that Alice
having access to W˜ can simulate the behavior of W on input
u0 using local randomness: We first consider the case where
Wˆx0u0 = Wˆx1u1 with u1 6= u0 and WA(x1|u1) 6= 0. We
define p :=WA(x0|u0)/WA(x1|u1). Then it holds that
W (x0y|u0v) = pW (x1y|u1v)
for all y ∈ {0, 1}, v ∈ V . It follows from the non-signaling
conditions that
W ((1−x0)y|u0v) = (1−p)W (x1y|u1v)+W ((1−x0)y|u1v)
for all y ∈ {0, 1}, v ∈ V . We assume x0 = x1 = 0. Then we
can simulate W using W˜ in the following way: Alice gives
input u1 to W˜ and gets output x. If x = 1, then Alice outputs
1. If x = 0, then Alice outputs 0 with probability p and 1 with
probability 1 − p. If WA(x0|u0) = 0 or Wˆ0u0 = Wˆ1u0 , then
Alice on input u0 outputs 0 with probability WA(0|u0) and
1 with probability WA(1|u0).
Theorem 2. A non-signaling box W : {0, 1}2 → {0, 1}2 that
fulfills neither Condition 1 nor Condition 2 does not allow for
information-theoretically secure bit commitment (with noise-
less communication only) and is local.
Proof: We first consider the case where there exists
(x0, u0) such that WA(x0|u0) = 0 or Wˆx0u0 = Wˆx1u1
for some (x1, u1) 6= (x0, u0). We assume WA(x0|u0) ≤
WA(x1|u1) and examine the box W˜ that is obtained by
removing input u0. W˜ is obviously local. If Wˆ (0|u1) =
Wˆ (1|u1), the box is independent and doesn’t allow for bit
commitment. If there is a perfectly correlated or anti-correlated
input pair, the box doesn’t allow for bit commitment according
to Theorem 1. Otherwise bit commitment can be reduced to
this box using Protocol I. From Lemma 19 it follows that
we can implement bit commitment from W if and only if bit
commitment can be implemented from W˜ . Thus, the claim
follows for all boxes with WA(x0|u0) = 0 or Wˆx0u0 = Wˆx1u1
for some (x1, u1) 6= (x0, u0). In the following we assume
WA(x0|u0) 6= 0 for all x0, u0 ∈ {0, 1} and Wˆz 6= Wˆz′ for all
z, z′ ∈ {0, 1}2 with z 6= z′.
(1) | extr(conv(Wˆ ))| ≥ 3: Then the box fulfills Condition 2
and we can securely implement bit commitment using Protocol
II.
(2) | extr(conv(Wˆ ))| = 2: We first consider the case
8Wˆ1u, Wˆ0u ∈ D. Without loss of generality, we can assume
u = 0. Then there exist 0 < λ0, µ0 < 1 such that
Wˆ01 = λ0Wˆ00 + (1− λ0)Wˆ10,
Wˆ11 = µ0Wˆ00 + (1− µ0)Wˆ10.
We define λ1 := 1−λ0 and µ1 := 1−µ0. Then it follows from
the non-signaling conditions that for all (y, v) ∈ {0, 1} × V
W (0y|1v)
WA(0|1) =
λ0W (0y|0v)
WA(0|0) +
λ1W (1y|0v)
WA(1|0) ,
W (1y|1v)
WA(1|1) =
µ0W (0y|0v)
WA(0|0) +
µ1W (1y|0v)
WA(1|0) .
We define
ax :=
λxW
A(0|1)
WA(x|0) , x ∈ {0, 1},
bx :=
µxW
A(1|1)
WA(x|0) , x ∈ {0, 1}.
Then it follows from the non-signaling conditions that for
all (y, v) ∈ {0, 1}×V it holds that W (0y|0v) +W (1y|0v) is
equal to
(a0 + b0)W (0y|0v) + (a1 + b1)W (1y|0v)
As we have have excluded the case Wˆ10 = Wˆ00, it follows
that a0 + b0 = a1 + b1 = 1. Then the box is local
as follows from W (xy|uv) = WA(0|0)V 0A(x|u)V 0B(y|v) +
WA(1|0)V 1A(x|u)V 1B(y|v) with
(x, u) V 0A(x|u) V 1A(x|u)
(0, 0) 1 0
(0, 1) a0 a1
(1, 0) 0 1
(1, 1) b0 b1
and
V 0B(y|v) := W (0y|0v)/WA(0|0),
V 1B(y|v) := W (1y|0v)/WA(1|0)
for all y, v ∈ {0, 1}. If one of the inputs (0, 0) or (0, 1) is
perfectly correlated or anti-correlated, then we cannot reduce
bit commitment to this box (Theorem 1). Otherwise we can
securely implement bit commitment from this box using
Protocol I.
Next, we consider the case Wˆx0, Wˆx′1 ∈ D, x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}.
We assume x = x′ = 0. Then it holds that
Wˆ10 = λ00Wˆ00 + λ01Wˆ01,
Wˆ11 = µ00Wˆ00 + µ10Wˆ10.
If there is u ∈ {0, 1} such that for all v ∈ {0, 1} the box is
neither perfectly correlated nor perfectly anti-correlated for
input (u, v), then the box fulfills Condition 1. Otherwise,
there must be v0, v1 ∈ {0, 1} such that the box is perfectly
correlated or anti-correlated for both (0, v0) and (1, v1). Then
it follows that λ00 = 0 and µ10 = 0, which is a contradiction
to our assumptions.
The case | extr(conv(Wˆ ))| ≤ 1 we have already excluded.
In order to prove that we can reduce bit commitment to any
box with binary outputs (and general input alphabets U and V)
that cannot be securely implemented from shared randomness
we need to give an alternative condition for the security of
Protocol II.
Condition 3. There exist u0, u1 ∈ U , u0 6= u1 and x0, x1 ∈
{0, 1} such that the following two conditions hold:
(1) Wx0u0 ,Wx1u1 are extreme points of conv(Wˆ ), i.e., for
all c ∈ {(x0, u0), (x1, u1)} it holds that for all probability
distributions P s.t. P (c) = 0∥∥∥Wˆc −∑
z
P (z)Wˆz
∥∥∥
1
≥ δ.
(2) Let c, c′ ∈ {(1 − x0, u0), (1 − x1, u1)} with c 6= c′. Then
for all probability distributions P such that P (c′) > 0 and
P (c) = 0 it holds that∥∥∥Wˆc −∑
z
P (z)Wˆz
∥∥∥
1
≥ δ.
To prove Protocol II secure for all boxes that fulfill Condi-
tion 3, we replace Lemma 15 with the following lemma. We
assume that (x0, u0) = (0, 0) and (x1, u1) = (0, 1).
Lemma 20. If dH(zn, z˜n) ≥ k1, then the probability that Bob
accepts z˜n is negligible in n.
Proof: For all wn ∈ T nQ,ǫ it holds that |N(xu|wn) −
n
2W
A(x|u)| ≤ ǫn ≤ 132k1. We distinguish the following two
cases:
(1) If there exists u′ ∈ {0, 1} such that N(u′|un) ≤ n/2 −
k1/8, then the statement follows from the proof of Lemma 15.
(2) If |n/2−N(u|un)| ≤ k1/8 for all u ∈ {0, 1}, then it fol-
lows from Lemma 7 that with overwhelming probability zn ∈
T nWA,ǫ(un). Assume zn ∈ T nWA,ǫ(un). If dH(zI00 , z˜I00) ≥
1
8k1 or dH(z
I01 , z˜I01) ≥ 18k1, then the claim follows from
Lemma 8 and Condition 3. If |{i ∈ I10 : zi = 11}| ≥ 18k1,
then the claim follows from Condition 3 and the proof of
Lemma 8 as follows: Let D := {k ∈ I10 : zk 6= z˜k}. We use
Condition 3 and replace (2) with∥∥∥ 1|I10|
∑
k∈I10
Wzk −W10
∥∥∥
1
=
|D|
|I10|
∥∥∥W10 − 1|D|
∑
k∈D
Wzk
∥∥∥
1
=
|D|
|I10|δ ≥
1
8
k1δ/n.
We assume z˜n ∈ T nQ,ǫ. Then it follows as in the proof of
Lemma 8 that Wnzn(T nW,ǫ(z˜n)) is negligible. The same holds
if |{i ∈ I11 : zi = 10}| ≥ 18k1. In all other cases it follows
that z˜n /∈ T nQ,ǫ.
Theorem 3. Bit Commitment can be reduced to any non-
signaling box with binary outputs that cannot be securely
implemented from shared randomness.
Proof: : If |U| ≤ 2, then the statement follows from
the proof of Theorem 2. Otherwise, we first eliminate the
cases where there exists (x0, u0) such that WA(x0|u0) = 0
or Wˆx0u0 = Wˆx1u1 for some (x1, u1) 6= (x0, u0) by
using Lemma 19 to reduce the box. Then we consider
9D := extr(conv(Wˆ )): In the case |D| = 2 the statement
is proven in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 2.
The case |D| ≥ 3 is a little bit more involved: If there is
Wˆ1u, Wˆ0u ∈ D, then Condition 2 is fulfilled and we can
implement bit commitment using Protocol II. Otherwise, we
can either implement bit commitment using Protocol I or for
every input u corresponding to an element of D there is an
input v for Bob such that the box is perfectly correlated or
anti-correlated. Let Wˆx0u0 ∈ D. Without loss of generality
we assume that W is perfectly correlated for input (u0, v0).
Then there exist λz with
∑
z:Wˆz∈D
λz = 1 such that
Wˆ(1−x0)u0 =
∑
z:Wˆz∈D
λzWz.
There exists (x1, u1) with u1 6= u0 such that λx1u1 > 0. We
assume x0 = x1 = 0. We have W (10|u0v0) = 0. This implies
W (00|u1v0) = 0. From the non-signaling conditions follows
that W (10|u1v0) = W (00|u0v0) > 0. There exists v1 ∈ V
such that (u1, v1) is perfectly correlated or anti-correlated. We
assume without loss of generality that (u1, v1) is perfectly
correlated. This implies W (00|u1v1) > 0 and W (10|u1v1) =
0. From λx1u1 > 0 follows that W (10|u0v1) > 0. So we
have Wˆ0u0 , Wˆ0u1 ∈ D, W (10|u0v0) = W (10|u1v1) = 0,
W (10|u1v0) > 0 and W (10|u0v1) > 0. Thus, Condition 3 is
fulfilled.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have shown that any bipartite non-signaling system with
binary outputs can either be securely realized from shared
randomness or allows for bit commitment.
An obvious open question is whether a similar result holds
for arbitrary output alphabets. Furthermore, it would be inter-
esting to know whether oblivious transfer can be implemented
from the same set of non-signaling systems.
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